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In December of 1973, Congress enacted the Regional Rail Reorganization
Act, which was signed by the President in January, 1974. Pursuant to the
terms of this legislation, the Department of Transportation (DOT) was
required to submit, within 30 days, a report containing conclusions and
recommendations for restructuring rail service in the area served by the
Penn Central and other bankrupt northeast railroads. On February 1, 1974,
this report was issued, based in substantial measure on the study,
Improving Railroad Productivity, Final Report of the Task Force on Railroad
Productivity (1943), and on the report prepared by R. I. Banks and
Associates for the Federal Railroad Administration, June, 1973, entitled
Development and Evaluation of an Economic Abstraction of Light Density
2
Rail Line Operation .
The 1973 Legislation and the DOT Report
This DOT proposal will go through several stages of review before
becoming effective:
1. The new Rail Services Planning Office of the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) will prepare a report, following hearings (which have
now been held)
.
Washington: National Commission on Productivity and the Council of
Economic Advisers, 1973.
vJashington: Federal Railroad Administration, 1973.
The DOT report is entitled Rail Services in the Midwest and
Northeast Region (Washington: U. S. Department of Transportation, 1974).
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2. The newly created United States Railway Association (USRA) , a
Federal agency created to plan and finance the restructuring of the
northeast rail system, will develop a preliminary plan based on the original
DOT plan and the ICC report on it.
3. The ICC will hold hearings on the preliminary plan and prepare a
report on it.
4. USRA will then develop a final system plan.
5. The ICC will evaluate this final plan.
6. Congress must approve or reject the final plan. If rejected, it
will be revised.
7. Once approved, the plan will serve as the basis on which the
property of the bankrupt roads (and on a voluntary basis, the lines of
solvent carriers) will be transferred to the new enterprise, Consolidated
Rail Corporation (CRC) , a privately owned, profit making enterprise.
The Act prescribed the various guidelines for restructuring; in brief,
it seeks:.
1. To create a financially self-sustaining rail system (CRC) in the
northeast.
2. To insure a rail system adequate to meet the needs of the area.
3. To preserve existing patterns of rail service so far as feasible;
to insure minimization of use of energy resources in providing transportation.
4. To preserve. competition in rail and other transport service in
the area.
Except those that, with Federal Court approval, opt but to reorganize
on traditional lines.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://wwvy.archive.org/details/preliminaryevalu177duej
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5. To aid in the attainment of desired environmental standards.
The report describes existing rail service; analyzes operating problems
and possible improvements; and recommends where. rail service should be
provided. To accomplish the overall objectives noted above, the report
proposed major restructuring of the railroads in the northeast in order to
make them self-sustaining by increasing productivity and bringing about
improvements of services. The restructuring requires substantial reduction
in main line mileage and thus in excess capacity, and streamlining of local
lines, with extensive abandonment, estimated to be about 25 percent of the
mileage in the area. Rail competition would be retained only on a few
high density routes. The report appeals to the solvent carriers for their
cooperation.
For purposes of analysis, the area involved was divided into some 184
zones, with analysis of traffic between and within zones. Stress is placed
on the major traffic generating points and service among them.
Proposals Relating to Main Lines
The report distinguishes sharply between high volume, interstate lines
and local service lines. The former operate between main traffic generating
zones; local service lines connect shippers within the zones to the inter-
state network. So far as the main lines are concerned, the objective of the
report is to concentrate the traffic on a much smaller number of lines in
order to bring utilization nearer to capacity. A figure of 30 million gross
ton miles per mile of line is regarded as the minimum necessary for the main
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1
lines; this would constitute about 30 percent utilization of a single track
CTC controlled line. By eliminating duplicating lines and reconstructing
the remaining lines to higher standards, and eliminating duplication in
terminal yards, substantial savings would be made. Only 10 percent of the
main line mileage in the eastern region now has the desired density
—
primarily because the flow is divided among a number of lines, as shown on
Figure 1, reproduced from the Report. Competitive routes would be sanctioned
only if traffic volume was sufficient to allow at least four freight trains
each way daily.
The general reasoning involved has merit. But several major questions
can be raised:
1. The report does not present data to show the amount of cost savings
from successive increases in density of traffic on main lines. Some Class II
railroads, with relatively light traffic, show cost per ton mile only
slightly higher than the heavy traffic routes. For example, with 1968 data,
the cost per ton mile for the following five roads is one cent per ton mile
or less, although none has more than 8 million gross ton miles per mile
of line:
Road
Lehigh and Hudson River
Pittsburgh and Shawmut
Alabama, Tennessee and Northern
Tennessee, Alabama and Georgia
Kansas, Oklahoma and Gulf
Net ton miles per 4
mile of line Cost per ton mile
3,568 1.04
1,115 .93
2,387 .99
1,625 .88
2,318 .50
This is, for example, approximately the volume on the Illinois Central
Gulf main line, Chicago-Centralia; the Penn Central, Chicago-Ft. Wayne-
Pittsburgh; the Rock Island, Chicago-Moline.
2
Cost includes all operating expenses, railroad retirement taxes, and
return on salvage value. Other taxes are omitted.
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Iti general, questions can be raised as to how great the savings from
concentration of traffic on a few lines actually are.
2. The proposal, through concentrating traffic on fewer lines, would
result in the elimination of a number of lines with ton mileage in excess of
one million gross ton miles per mile of line, even though it is generally
agreed that any line with this volume of traffic is economically viable.
DOT's justification is that by eliminating these lines and concentrating
the traffic on a smaller number of retained lines, average cost could be
reduced and service improved by reconstruction of track and more frequent
train departures. Without question this argument has some merit. But
there are significant costs involved, which the report ignores:
a. The sharp increase in the volume of traffic to be handled in yards
in major metropolitan areas. The report, for example, calls for the
elimination of three east-west routes across central Illinois, as noted on
Figure 2: the Toledo, Peoria and Western; the Norfolk and Western's Peoria-
Lima line (formerly Nickel Plate); and the Penn Central's Peoria and Eastern
(Peoria-Indianapolis) . All three of these lines have annual traffic volume
in excess of one million gross ton miles per mile of line. The traffic
now moving on these lines, much of it bridge traffic from the west routed by
these lines to minimize loss of time in Chicago terminals, would have to be
routed via the Chicago area. Substantial additional investment in terminal
yards facilities would undoubtedly be necessary, or the chaos encountered
in the Penn Central's restructuring of operations would be encountered.
But apart from this consideration is the question of whether the gains from
greater concentration of traffic would more than offset the costs from the
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INDIANA
ILLINOIS
Figure 2
East-West Lines in Central Illinois Proposed for Abandonment
Heavy lines show routes to be discontinued.
';.-•
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additional complications created in the major intermediate terminals.
b. Circuity. The elimination of such lines would result in sub-
stantial increase in circuity of routing for various types of traffic.
With the same example as given above: grain originating at such Illinois
points as Gibson City, Farmer City, Champaign, Fairbury, Forrest, and
Gilman, all major elevator centers on the lines indicated above, could no
longer move directly east, as much of it now does, but would have to be
rerouted north or south initially. The total eastbound traffic from these
and similar points is very substantial—thousands of carloads a year.
3. Community loss of service. Elimination of these lines would leave
hundreds of communities without service at all, since with all the bridge
traffic removed, as well as that from communities also served by other
lines to be retained, the remaining traffic does not, in most instances,
meet the minimum requirements discussed in the next section of the chapter.
Thus a part of the price to be paid to gain greater concentration of main
line traffic on a few routes is the complete loss in service to large
numbers of communities, where there has been every expectation of continued
rail service, as the lines involved were known to have adequate traffic to
be self-supporting.
A few communities on these lines offering enough traffic to meet the
report's formula would be left on dead-end branch lines instead of through
lines, with substantial deterioration in quality of service, as for example,
Paris and Robinson, Illinois.
In the table below the lines in Illinois to be abandoned under this
policy are listed as an example of the extent of elimination of lines that
would occur.
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Penn Central:
Peoria and Eastern, Peoria-Champaign-Indianapolis
Kankakee-Indianapolis
Chicago-Danville-Cairo
Terre Haute-Mattoon-St. Louis
Illinois Central:
Evansville-Mattoon-Decatur-Peoria
Pana-Decatur-Freeport
Effingham-Indianapolis
Champaign-Havana
Louisville and Nashville: St. Louis-Evansville
Toledo, Peoria and Western: Peoria-Effner
Portions of some of these lines would be retained.
The traffic volume on all of these lines is between one million and
4.9 million gross ton miles per mile of line, except portions of the Penn
Central's Chicago-Danville-Cairo line (between 10 and 19.9 million gross
ton miles per mile of line from Robinson to Eldorado and 5-9.9 million
north of Robinson).
Proposals for Local Service (Branch) Lines
The basic principle followed in the report, so far as local service
lines are concerned, is that there must be a high probability of economic
viability—the possibility of covering all costs—for them to be included
in the restructured system. The recommendations, as with the main lines,
include lines of solvent roads in the area as well as insolvent ones, even
in situations in which the lines are in no way competitive with a restructured
Penn Central system.
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The Banks Study
The basis of this portion of the DOT plan is the Banks report noted
above. The aim of the study was to analyze the relationship between
volume of traffic and profitability on light traffic lines (defined as
those with traffic of less than 500 cars originated or terminated per mile
per year) in order to develop a formula to predict the profitability of
any branch line. A sample of 100 light traffic lines in each of the three
ICC regions (including independent Class IT. roads and branches of major
systems) was selected, with varying length and density. For each line,
revenue attributable to the line and the costs for which the line was
responsible were calculated and the profitability thus determined was
related to the traffic volume.
Revenue was estimated on the basis of traffic originated or terminated
on the line, all bridge traffic being eliminated and any traffic both
originating and terminating on the line (which is negligible on such lines)
excluded. The revenue attributable to the line was calculated by multi-
plying the cars originating or terminating on the line times the sum of
three elements: (1) revenue contribution to the railroad system from
traffic originating or terminating on the line less the variable costs of
handling that traffic off of the branch; (2) the cost of originating or
terminating a car in. the district (since the branch is performing this
<
function for the system); (3) the average haul on the line times the
variable cost of hauling a loaded car mile in the district (since the
branch is performing this service for the system)
.
1
Light Traffic Density Rail Line Operations, op. cit
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The cost figures for each line were built from data for the type of
operations regarded as typical for branch lines, given the length and
the traffic volume of the line:
A. Costs Related to Track
1. Direct maintenance of way costs, ascertained from Class II
data, regressing maintenance expenditures against volume of
traffic. For direct maintenance, a minimum of $2,335 per
mile was ascertained, plus an increase of $1.97 per mile for
every 1,000 gross ton miles per mile of line. Superintendence
of maintenance was added. Adjustments are also made for higher
speeds.
2. Ten percent return on salvage value of the line. Salvage
value is calculated by a formula based upon an estimated
typical salvage value of $9,000 a mile. The formula establishes
the value per mile as four times the constant maintenance of
way element ($2,335 per mile) plus four times the incremental
cost of maintenance per 1,000 gross ton miles.
3. Property tax, an arbitrary $50 a mile.
4. Return on the value of land, 10 percent on a value of $5,000
per mile of line.
The total of these elements is $4,029 per mile plus $50
a mile per hour of speed of operation in excess of 10 mph, plus
$3.09 per mile per 1,000 gross ton miles of traffic.
B. Maintenance of Equipment. This is calculated on a per hour of use
basis from typical Class I data, Including return on investment and depreciation,
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Per diem charges were used as a measure of freight car maintenance,
depreciation, and return on investment.
C. Fuel Expenses . Typical coses per engine mile times hours of
engine use.
D. Train Operating Expenses. Rased on typical wage rates, hours of
operation necessary, and a crew of four.
E. General and other items based on Class I experience allocated
to branch lines on a formula basis.
The data show the great importance of track costs for light traffic
density lines— 54 percent of the total, in the eastern region, including
return on salvage value and land. Train crew operating expenses were only
10 percent of the total.
On the basis of this data, the profitability of each line in the sample
was calculated, and then related to the volume of traffic. From this
analysis were developed estimated figures of the volume of traffic necessary
in each of the three regions for a line of varying lengths to break even.
In addition to this basic figure, upper and lower probability ranges were
ascertained on a 90 percent basis; in 90 percent of all cases the actual
break-even point will fall between the upper and lower limits. Thus, for
example, a 10 mile line in the eastern district would require an estimated
565 cars per mile to break even, with 90 percent probability that the
figure will be between the upper criterion of 734 cars and the lower
criterion of 396 cars.
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Typical figures are indicated below for the Eastern region:
Ca,< Originator Tested ,er Yea,1
Length of Line, Miles Upper Criterion Lower Criterion
1 271
5 477 139
10 734 396
20 1,329 673
30 1,788 1 ,132
The upper criterion figures are lower in the west, higher in the
south, than In the eastern district.
Procedures Relating to Branch Lines
For each line not designated to be a main interstate line as dis-
cussed above, the procedure followed in determining whether or not service
should be provided on branch lines was as follows:
1. Only traffic originating or terminating on the line was considered;
all "bridge" traffic passing over the line, and, apparently, all traffic
originating or terminating at points to continue to have service on
other lines, was disregarded.
2. Traffic to and from points originating or terminating less than
75 cars a year was disregarded. Such points would not continue to have
service under the proposal, even if situated on lines to be retained. This
policy is defended only by the statement that providing service to such
points would not be economic.
Banks Report, op. cit., p. 115.
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3. The traffic available on the line, under the two rules indicated,
was compared with the upper criterion line of the Banks report. Only lines
with traffic above the upper criterion would be. included in the CRC system.
Evaluation of the Provisions Relating to Local Service
The portion of the report relating to abandonment of light traffic
lines is open to serious criticism. Clearly there are lines in the northeast
that are uneconomic on any basis and must be eliminated for an efficient
system; there are lines that handle, in total, no more than 25 cars a
1 :
year. But the net result of the proposals go far beyond lines such as
these. More specifically, the following aspects of the proposal are open
to question, apart from the more general issues noted in the concluding
section:
1. Data of shipments from various points. These were, apparently,
collected very hastily and errors were inevitable; clearly no final action
should be taken until accurate data are obtained. One local shipping point
reports that DOT used a figure of 70 cars a year shipped when the actual
figure was 700, for example.
The entire proposal was based on 1972 data only, regardless of local
conditiotiV, such as a prolonged strike in a factory on the line, that made
the figure atypical.
Projection of the figures into the next decade are likewise desirable
when feasible.
2. Adjustment of data for car shortages. Particularly in grain
movements in the midwest, the volume moving by rail has been much less in
There were five such lines in the Banks report sample of 100 eastern
railroads.
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the last five years than the shippers wished to move by rail because of the
shortage of grain cars. This has particularly affected the movements from
the smaller towns. Before final decision is made, figures must be corrected
upward to take this factor into consideration. Grain elevators can provide
almost exact figures of the. volume shipped by truck only because of the
shortage of grain cars.
A more intangible question is also raised: the traffic on Penn Central
lines would have been greater in the last several years had service quality
been better. This element is very difficult to adjust for in any precise
way, but the problem suggests using figures altered somewhat from those
in the Banks report.
3. The 75 car rule. The most devastating element in the DOT procedure
has been that of disregarding any shipping point that originates or terminates
less than 75 cars a year; such points would be denied service even if they
were on lines retained. This rule is not backed by any statistical evidence
and is simply contrary to common sense. On a line to be retained from A
via B to C, it costs no more
—
perhaps even less—to pick up cars from a
siding located at intermediate point S than from additional sidings at
points A and C, even if point B generates no more than 20 cars a year. The
sidings are in place; no station is maintained; switching time is small.
In many instances, the strict adherence to the 75 car rule results in
<
complete elimination of service on lines that would meet the necessary
1
For example, the Glfford Elevator at Gifford, Illinois, shipped 481
cars by rail August 1, 1971 - July 31, 1972. In the following year only
277 cars were shipped by rail because of unavailability of cars; had cars
been available about 490 cars would have been shipped. Data provided by the
elevator.
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traffic volume formula. Note for example the situations below.
Both lines are 10 miles in length and thus require 734 cars a year to meet
the DOT upper criteria. There are two towns on each, with the traffic
generated as shown on the diagram.
A
650
cars
B
100
cars
-#~
c
70
cars
D
700
cars
The line serving A and B would be retained; that serving C and D
would not be, even though both exceed the required traffic volume figure.
The C-D branch has more total traffic than A-B, yet is denied service
because the 70 cars available from point C are not counted. This rule is
unreasonable.
4. The Banks study upper criteria. Inclusion in the new CRC system
only of lines that meet the upper criterion of the Banks report can be
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justified only on the basis of complete emphasis on assurance of profitability;
presumably if the "estimated" figure were used, half way between the upper
and lower criteria, on the whole the lines included would break even, even
though some did not,
5. The data of the Banks report. Several questions may be raised about
the figures used in the Banks study, although on the whole they appear to be
reasonable:
a. The salvage value figure may be unreasonably high; the basic $9,000
figure which underlies the formula is based on a sample of one, and other
studies suggest that a lower figure may be appropriate.
b. The sale value of land, estimated at $500 an acre, with 10 acres
to a mile of line, is unreasonably high for some lines. In small,
declining towns, even the land in the towns on which the station and sidings
are located may have little sale value . The right of way may have been
given on a conditional basis, reverting to the adjacent landowners if no
longer used for rail purposes; or there may simply be no bidders.
c. The use of a 10 percent rate of return figure is open to a basic
question: should relatively high current interest rates be used, or an
average of rates over a period of years? It is quite true that if the line
is abandoned today, the money can be reinvested at a relatively high figure.
But five years from now, the return figure may be much less; interest
<
rates in part reflect monetary policies.
d. The train operating expenses are based upon use of a four-man
crew. This may be reasonable so far as CRC is concerned, but there is the
possibility of negotiating agreements with the unions for smaller crews on
lighter traffic lines.
e. The conclusion that maintenance costs require an additional $1.97
per 1,000 gross ton miles per mile of line, in addition to the basic $2,335
produces nonsense results for high density lines. The figures would be
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far in excess of actual maintenance expenditures on such lines that are
maintained at high standards (for example, $41,735 a mile for 20 million
gross ton miles per mile of line)
.
6. The significance of the rate structure. One of the peculiarities
of the results of the Banks study is that the minimum number of cars
necessary to meet the criteria increases with distance on a linear basis,
almost proportionally. Thus, a 10 mile line requires 734 cars, or 73
cars per mile; a 20 mile line 1,329 cars, or 67 cars per mile. It should
be noted that if (1) the traffic rnoves over the entire line in each
instance, and (2) the rates are proportional to distance, no more cars, in
total, would be required for the longer line to be viable than for the
shorter. In fact, fewer cars would be required; because of the substantial
terminal cost element in overall costs (switching of cars and assembly of
trains), the cost per ton mile falls sharply as distance increases. This
is borne out clearly by data of Class II railroads in a study by the
author now nsaring completion. Even If the revenue per mile falls as
distance increases, if it fails no more rapidly than cost falls and the
traffic moves over the entire distance on each line, the number of cars
required for viability would be the same on the 20 mile line as on the
10 mile line, and therefore half as many per mile.
In practice, rate structures affecting branch lines are often not of
this character, particularly because of use of rate groups; the rate from
various points on the branch may all be the same regardless of distance.
Therefore the railroad gets no more revenue for shipments over the 20 mile
line than it does over the 10 mile line, and thus must have more cars In total
on the longer line for it to break even. Even granted this assumption about
rates, however, the Banks figures are suspect because of the importance of
terminal costs in overall costs.
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7. Problems with the use of a formula, Determination of the fate of
particular lines by a formula, while acceptable as a first step, is not
satisfactory for the final plan:
a. The formula is based on cars loaded, without respect either to loaded
weight of the cars or to rates on the commodities. If two lines of the
same length have the same numbers of cars originating or terminating, but
one has much higher loading per ear and/or has traffic such that rates
are much higher per mile, one is clearly more profitable than the other.
In other words, lines with light loading and/or low rates may qualify under
the formula, while other lines with fewer cars but higher loading and/or
higher rate traffic do not qualify but would be. more profitable.
b. Lines differ greatly in frequency of service required, a point noted in
the report and stressed in the Improving Railroad Productivity study referred to
in the introduction. The Penn Central lines causing the greatest losses
are not the very light traffic lines, but ones with higher traffic but
requiring much more frequent service. Lines differ tremendously in fre-
quency of service required; once a week service may be adequate for handling
ore or coal; daily service may be necessary for manufactured goods pro-
duced by a factory on the. line. Some lines (primarily in the west) require
only seasonal operation.
c. Differences in the nature of the traffic influence the suitability
i
of piggyback operation as a substitute for the rail line and thus the
justification for retention of the line.
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The Lower Limits of Traffic Below Which Support by Subsidy Should
Not Be Considered
The plan also proposes certain lower limits of traffic below which
subsidy should not be given, as shown in Figure 3. In other words, lines
with traffic above the upper criterion would be included in the CRC; those
below the lower criterion would be abandoned without consideration of sub-
sidy; those between the two criceria would be considered for subsidy if
initiative were taken by local or state governments. This lower criterion
line is not based on the lower criteria of the Banks report, but upon an
analysis (the details of which are not revealed) made by DOT of the relative
costs of shipment by rail and motor carrier for the given volumes and dis-
tances. It will be noted that while the line rises initially it levels
out at about 30 miles; beyond this, additional cars would not be necessary
for the line to be continued. The initial rise, however, is somewhat sur-
prising, considering the importance of terminal costs in rail operation
over shorter distances and the nonrelevance of freight rate structures in
comparing rail and motor carrier costs.
The figures of the lower line do not appear to to be unreasonable.
They are expressed in net tons per w£ek rather than cars per year, but,
with the average car loading of 50 tons (and 52 weeks in a year) the
figures, with adjustment of decimals, are almost identical. For a 5 mile
line, 175 tons are required per week or 7,800 per year; for a 10 mile line,
275, or 14,300 per year; 20 mile, 450; 30 mile, 525, or 30,000 per year.
In other words, for a 10 mile line about 28 cars per mile per year are
required instead of the 66 for the upper criteria for Inclusion in the CRC.

FIGURE 3
RAILROAD-MOTOR CARRIER BREAKEVEN ANALYSIS
FOR LOCAL SERVICE LINES OF VARYING LENGTH
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These figures were compared with the actual traffic volumes of Class II
railroads in 1968 (the last year for which published data are available).
Of a sample of 207 lines, only thirteen had traffic below this figure (all
but one in the eastern district) . Three of these roads showed an operating
profit. The sum of the operating deficit of five was only $33,702. A very
small sam of money could have insured keeping even these lines in operation.
There is serious objection, therefore, to the use of any one figure as
an arbitrary one below which subsidy will not be considered. Certainly
these roads are likely to be submarginal, but, given the type of freight
and the nature of operations required, they may be able to approximate
covering their costs, so that only a small subsidy, justified by externalities,
would be required.
Conclusions.
The need for lessening duplication of main line operation and for
either abandoning or subsidizing light traffic lines is clear, not only
in the northeast but in other parts of the country as well. The general
philosophy of the DOT plan along these lines is obviously a necessary one.
But serious questions can be raised:
1. The sacrifice of a large number of secondary main lines may
result in greater cost than gain --through loss of direct routing, increased
congestion in major terminals, and loss of service to the communities
involved.
2. The use of the 75 car rule appears to have little justification
and is responsible for much of the proposed line abandonment; elimination
of it in development of the revised plan is clearly warranted.
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3. While the strict policy of DOT in using the upper criteria of
the Banks study, instead of the estimated figures, can be questioned, at
least a case can be made for so doing.
4. In revising the plan, the rigid formula approach must be abandoned,
with proposals modified in light of specific conditions of rail use in
various areas and particularly recognizing the significance of freight car
shortages in depressing use on certain lines in 1972. The grain elevator
lines are particularly affected.
5. DOT has not, in the plans, given consideration to externalities
—
pollution, energy use, road costs and congestion, etc. Clearly these need
to be considered in determining subsidization policy. Because of these
factors, which are of national concern, the rule of the legislation, that
initiative for subsidy must come from local and state governments, is
unfortunate.
6. Determining of eligibility for subsidy should not be based on a
rigid formula, but local conditions need be considered.
7. The radical approach of the DOT plan has created extreme uncertainty
in the communities threatened with loss of rail service. Plans for expansion
have been stopped; relocation is being considered. The sooner this
uncertainty can be dispelled, the better for all concerned. The solvent
railroads can assist by making clear to shippers which portions of the plan
they do not plan to implement; the most serious problems confront the
shippers on the bankrupt lines.
There Is some danger that the DOT, through overkill, may have sabotaged
what it was seeking to accomplish, by creating intense opposition to the
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whole program. Abandonment of a rail line is an action that cannot be
undone a few years later; loss of a line has significant long run impli-
cations for a community. A case can be made, therefore, for a policy of
giving the benefit of the doubt to continued operation—as abandonment is
always possible in the future while rebuilding of a line normally is
not—whereas DOT went to the opposite extreme.
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